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JOSEPH P. MONTELEONE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Labor-employment law has traditionally been a fairly special­
ized area of practice provided by certain "boutique" firms (some 
confining their practice solely on behalf of management as opposed 
to labor or vice versa) and specialized practice groups within larger 
firms. It is not unusual for a large employer to tum to a single one 
of these firms for all of its employment-related legal work and de­
velop a long-term and extensive relationship with them. Particu­
larly when a firm has numerous offices nationwide, the relationship 
may be one without any practical geographic limitations. 
With the growing popularity of employment practices liability 
insurance ("EPLI") over the recent years, the question arises under 
those policies as to who controls the defense process, including the 
choice of counsel. Although there is no "generic" EPLI policy 
form, the major underwriters of this business all appear to be uni­
form, in that their policies' language clearly provides the insurer 
with the right and duty to defend and the right to select and appoint 
defense counsel on behalf of the insureds under the policy. 
* Joseph P. Monteleone is Senior Vice President and Claims Counsel for Reli­
ance National. The opinions expressed herein are personal to the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the opinions of Reliance National or of any insurance company in the 
Reliance National Insurance Group. Further, the author, through these materials, does 
not purport to restate, explain, or interpret any policy of insurance issued by a member 
company in the Reliance Insurance Group. 
While the information contained in these materials is believed to be accurate and 
authoritative, it is not intended to be a substitute for specific legal, insurance, or other 
professional advice. The reader should consult legal and/or insurance professionals for 
advice or assistance on specific issues of interest. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the considerable and able assistance of 
Nicholas J. Conca, Vice President and Claims Counsel at Reliance National, and Linda 
M. Soughan, Claims Counsel at Reliance National, in researching and preparing, in 
particular, the discussions of New York and Illinois law. 
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That having been said, the insurer's rights in this regard are 
often tempered by a number of legal, as well as business and practi­
cal considerations. Given that the EPLI product is relatively new, 
there is presently no caselaw guidance specific to these policies. 
However, the issue has been frequently considered under other lia­
bility insurance policies, and the guidance provided by those deci­
sions should in many respects be applicable to EPLI. 
As EPLI policies are of the "duty to defend" variety, it is help­
ful to examine decisions construing the extent of the insurer's right 
to select defense counsel under commercial or comprehensive gen­
eral liability and other types of policies that impose a duty to de­
fend. Absent any significant coverage issues that might give rise to 
a conflict of interest between the insurer and its insureds, the in­
surer may generally rely on its policy contract language providing it 
with the right to select the insured's defense counsel.1 When the 
insurer assumes the defense of its insured subject to a reservation of 
rights, however, one of the first significant issues presented for reso­
lution is whether the insurer will be able to control the selection of 
defense counsel. 
Although counsel who defends the insured, regardless of 
whether such counsel is selected by the insurer or the insured itself, 
will always owe its primary (if not sole) fiduciary duty to the in­
sured as its client, counsel selected by the insurer also has an attor­
ney-client relationship with the insurer as well.2 It is this 
"secondary allegiance" that has caused some courts and commenta­
tors to hold that the insurer should be precluded from controlling 
the selection of counsel in most reservation of rights situations.3 As 
will be discussed below, however, not every reservation of rights or 
assertion of a partial disclaimer of coverage should give rise to a 
relinquishment of what would otherwise be the right of the insurer 
to select defense counsel. 4 
This Article explores the law of three important jurisdictions 
with respect to this issue, namely, California, New York, and Illi­
1. See, e.g., Cardin v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 745 F. Supp. 330 (D. Md. 1990); 
McGee v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Maryland Casualty 
Co. v. Peppers, 64 III. 2d 187,355 N.E.2d 24 (1976). 
2. See Doctors' Ins. Servs. Co. v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr. 674 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1990), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1342 (Cal. March 28, 1991); Illinois Mun. 
League Risk Management Ass'n v. Seibert, 223 III. App. 3d 864, 585 N.E.2d 1130, ap­
peal denied, 145 III.2d 634, 596 N.E.2d 628 (1992). 
3. See generally Kansas Bankers Sur. Co. v. Lynass, 920 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1990); 
Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 503 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1974). 
4. See Federal Ins. Co. v. X-Rite, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Mich. 1990). 
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nois. This type of analysis provides an illustration of how the courts 
have addressed the process of selecting counsel. As noted above, 
courts have not yet addressed this issue in the context of EPLI cov­
erage, but a look back at how the issue historically has been treated 
by the courts nevertheless is instructive. This Article also discusses 
some of the practical dynamics of the EPLI relationship and pro­
vides some insight into how this issue might be addressed in the· 
EPLI arena. 
I. CALIFORNIA 
Probably the most notorious judicial decision in this area was 
the commonly-referenced Cumis case in California in the mid­
1980s.5 In summary, the Cumis court held that once the insurer 
reserved rights, it relinquished the right to unconditionally select 
counsel and had to reimburse the insured for the costs of counsel it 
retained to defend itself and protect its potentially uninsured 
interest. 
Cumis, however, has been clarified by both statute, at section 
2860 of the California Civil Code and subsequent judicial deci­
sions.6 For example, it is now clear that not every reservation of 
rights gives rise to the right to independent counsel but rather only 
those reservations on coverage issues which, by their nature, can be 
influenced by the way the defense is conducted.7 Perhaps the prime 
example of this would be a reservation to deny on the basis of in­
tentional misconduct. Although it would be to the mutual advan­
tage of insured and insurer to support a position of no liability, if 
there were to be liability on the part of the insured to the claimant, 
the insurer would be in a better position if the insured's culpable 
conduct was intentional, as opposed to a lesser degree such as 
negligence. . 
However, the mere fact that the insurer asserts the position 
that there would be no coverage for punitive damages, if awarded, 
does not give rise to the right to Cumis counsel.8 Likewise, the Cal­
5. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
6. See, e.g., Centennial Ins. Co. v. Murat, 253 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) 
(Not officially published); McGee v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985). 
7. This rule is not particular to California insurance jurisprudence. See, e.g., Steel 
Erection Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 392 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). 
8. CAL. CIv. CoDE § 2860(b) (1993); see also Parker v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 440 
N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981). 
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ifornia Civil Code now provides that no conflict of interest exists 
merely because an insured is sued for an amount in excess of insur­
ance policy limits.9 
Further, the insurer has some protection from abusive billings 
by Cumis counsel. Courts have held that such counsel are only en­
titled to be reimbursed at prevailing rates in effect by the insurer 
for its own panel counsel in the particular geographic area and area 
of practice.10 
A California appellate decision, rendered after both the deci­
sion in Cumis and enactment of the current version of section 2860 
but commenting upon the obligations of an insured without regard 
to that decision and statute, further clarifies the parties rights and 
obligations in this area.ll 
[T]he duty of good faith imposed upon an insured includes the 
obligation to act reasonably in selecting as independent [defense] 
counsel an experienced attorney qualified to present a meaning­
ful defense and willing to engage in ethical billing practices sus­
ceptible to review at a standard stricter than that of the 
marketplace .12 
II. NEW YORK 
Unlike California, the general rule in New York has not been 
codified but is embodied in two landmark decisions both rendered 
by the New York Court of Appeals. The first, Prashker v. United 
States Guarantee Co. P dates back to the 1950s and the second, 
Public Service Mutual Insurance Co. v. Goldfarb,14 was issued ap­
proximately twenty-five years later, in 1981. These decisions leave 
little doubt that New York law in this area is very much like that of 
California: if a conflict of interest exists between the insured and 
the insurer with respect to the defense of a claim, the insured is 
entitled to counsel of its own choosing. 
This rule has been amplified, however, by subsequent decisions 
of other courts, including the New York state intermediate appel­
9. Courts outside California have ruled similarly. See, e.g., Zieman Mfg. Co. v. 
St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 724 F. 2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1983); Parker, 440 N.Y.S.2d 
at 964. 
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(a}. 
11. Center Found. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
12. Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
13. 154 N.Y.S.2d 910, 136 N.E.2d 871 (1956). 
14. 444 N.Y.S.2d 422, 425 N.E.2d 810 (1981). 
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late courts and federal courts interpreting New York law.15 As dis­
cussed below, where courts have departed from or otherwise 
expanded the seemingly absolute rule enunciated by the New York 
Court of Appeals, they have done so because of distinguishable pol­
icy.language or compelling factual settings. 
As in California, the New York courts have not specifically ad­
dressed this issue in the context of an employment practices policy. 
However, there is no reason to suspect that the Prashker and Gold­
farb analyses would be applied any differently to an employment 
practices policy than they have been to other duty to defend 
policies. 
To provide some background, Prashker involved a coverage is­
sue under a liability policy that insured, among other things, a pri­
vate plane owned by a corporation. During one flight, the plane 
was piloted by Nathan Prashker, accompanied by a single passen­
ger. Prashker held a license to pilot an aircraft under visual flying 
conditions, but he was not licensed to fly under instrument flying 
conditions. The plane took off in dense fog and ultimately crashed, 
killing both people. 
The passenger's heirs filed suit against Prashker's estate, and 
the estate sought defense and indemnity coverage under the liabil­
ity policy. The insurer denied any obligation under the policy, on 
the ground that the policy excluded coverage for any insured who 
operated an aircraft in violation of Civil Aeronautics Administra­
tion regulations. Prashker's operation of the plane in foggy condi­
tions did indeed constitute such a violation. A declaratory 
judgment action ensued. 
The court concluded that some of the allegations against Prash­
ker's estate were based on negligence and thus potentially would be 
covered under the policy. Other allegations, however, were 
grounded upon regulatory violations, which were excluded from 
coverage. Notwithstanding the fact that the complaint pled poten­
tially covered allegations, the insurer argued that it could not be 
expected to defend the suit because, 
[I]t would subject to divided loyalty any attorneys who might de­
fend the action, in that their duty to the assureds would be to 
endeavor to defeat recovery on any ground, whereas their duty 
to the insurance company would be to defeat recovery only upon 
such grounds as might render the insurance company liable,16 
15. See infra notes 16 to 30. 
16. Prashker, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 917, 136 N.E.2d at 876. 
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The court, however, easily resolved this problem by noting that, 
If any such conflict of interests arises, as it probably will, the se­
lection of the attorneys to represent the assureds should be made 
by them rather than by the insurance company, which should re­
main liable for the payment of the reasonable value of the serv­
ices of whatever attorneys the assureds selectP 
New York's Court of Appeals thus crafted the general rule that 
continues to stand today, albeit with considerable massaging in sub­
sequent decisions. 
Approximately twenty-five years later, the New York Court of 
Appeals reiterated this rule of law in the Goldfarb decision. IS In 
that case, an insured dentist sought coverage under his professional 
liability policy for his defense in a suit by a former patient charging 
sexual abuse. The insurer denied coverage on the grounds, among 
others, that the complaint alleged criminal acts, which were unin­
surable under New York's public policy. 
The court drew a distinction, however, between a criminal act 
that caused an intended injury (which is uninsurable) and a criminal 
or intentional act that caused an unintended injury (which is insura­
ble),19 The issue of whether the insured committed uninsurable 
acts was one that could only be determined after the factual record 
of the case was fully developed. In the meantime, the insurer owed 
the insured a defense in the action. 
Given that the insurer's interest in defending the suit was in 
conflict with the insured's - the insurer being liable only upon a 
showing that the insured's acts caused unintended injuries - the 
insured was entitled to a defense by an attorney of his own choos­
ing. The reasonable fees of such attorney were to be paid by the 
insurer. 
In a footnote, the Goldfarb court provided some additional 
guidance on the issue of when a conflict necessitating separate 
counsel arises. The court stated: 
That is not to say that a conflict of interest requiring retention of 
separate counsel will arise in every case where multiple claims 
are made. Independent counsel is only necessary in cases where 
the defense attorney's duty to the insured would require that he 
defeat liability on any ground and his duty to the insurer would 
require that he defeat liability only upon grounds which would 
17. Id. 
18. Goldfarb, 444 N.Y.S.2d 422, 425 N.E.2d 810. 
19. Id. at 401, 425 N.E.2d at 815. 
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render the insurer liable. When such a conflict is apparent, the 
insured must be free to choose his own counsel whose reasonable 
fee is to be paid by the insurer. On the other hand, where multi­
ple claims present no conflict - for example, where the insur­
ance contract provides liability coverage only for personal 
injuries and the claim against the insured seeks recovery for 
property damage as well as for personal injuries - no threat of 
divided loyalty is present and there is no need for the retention of 
separate counsel. This is so because in such a situation the ques­
tion of insurance coverage is not intertwined with the question of 
the insured's liability.2o 
The court set "parameters" for determining whether a conflict 
of interest exists requiring the retention of separate counsel in a 
given case. The scope of these parameters, which was not precisely 
defined by the Goldfarb court, has been the subject of much debate 
since the Goldfarb decision. 
One later decision held that so long as a potential conflict ex­
isted between the insured and the insurer, independent counsel was 
necessary.21 In that case, the face of the complaint only contained 
allegations of negligence. The insurance company conceded, how­
ever, that it intended to investigate the matter with an eye towards 
avoiding coverage by showing that the insured acted intentionally. 
Upon considering prior decisions in which the above footnote 
in Goldfarb was at issue, the court held that the insurance company 
was required to look beyond the complaint to determine whether, 
as a factual matter, a conflict necessitated independent counsel. 
The inquiry did not end merely because the complaint itself con­
tained no allegations of intentional misconduct. . The insurance 
company could salvage its right to appoint counsel only if no "ex­
traneous" conflicts potentially could arise. Since the specter of a 
denial of coverage loomed over the insured, independent counsel 
was warranted. 
Separate and apart from the issue of whether a conflict exists 
because covered and non-covered claims are asserted against the 
insured, there is the issue of litigation strategy. What if the allega­
tions in the complaint are completely covered, but the insured and 
the insurer simply have different interests in how to defend the 
claim? Does that situation create a conflict that would require the 
retention of separate counsel? One New York appellate court an­
20. [d. at 401, 425 N.E.2d at 815. 
21. Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Guagenti, 599 N.Y.S.2d 215,' 216 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) 
(citing Baron v. Home Ins. Co., 492 N.Y.S.2d 50 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1985)). 
166 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:159 
swered that question in the affirmative and held that the insurer 
could not defeat its insured's right to select independent counsel by 
arguing that collectively they were united in interest in their pursuit 
of defeating the claimant. The court observed: 
In practically all, if not all cases, the insured and the insurer will 
have a common interest in defeating the claim made against the 
insured. What changed the rights of the insurer and the insured 
in those cases were the conflicts arising from their divergent in­
terests, in how they would prefer to go about defeating such 
claims. The interests of [the insured] and [the insurer] diverged 
seriously here, though each wished to defeat the claim. . .. [The 
insurer], having insured the title of a heavily mortgaged property, 
could proceed leisurely. [The insured] needed a quicker resolu­
tion to keep open the possibility of refinancing, to retain custom­
ers and employees, and to stay in business. There was a crucial 
conflict of interests between them, and [the insured] had the right 
to its own attomeys.22 
As in California, the New York courts thus have moved be­
yond an assessment of coverage issues in evaluating whether in­
dependent counsel is needed. It is clear that if counsel's tactical 
decisions in the litigation can adversely impact the interests of 
either the insured or the insurer, counsel must be independent.23 
This issue of divergence in litigation strategy is present in many 
EPLI cases. Take the example of a claim for sexual harassment 
against a prominent business person who works for a well known 
company with a "clean" reputation. The insured in that case may 
look to resolve the matter· quickly and quietly, and may be willing 
to settle the claim for a larger amount for public relations reasons. 
The EPLI insurer, on the other hand, may want to litigate the mat­
ter in order to discredit the plaintiff's case, thus driving down the 
settlement value of the claim. Here, under the rationale of 69th 
Street and Ladner, independent counsel may be warranted although 
the question remains as to whether the insurer is obligated to pay 
for that separate representation under the applicable liability insur­
ance policy.24 
22. 69th St. and 2nd Ave. Garage Assoes., L.P. v. TIeor TItle Guar. Co., 622 
N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (emphasis added). 
23. Ladner v. American Home Assurance Co., 607 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (N.Y. App. 
Div.1994). 
24. Even where an independent counsel is in place, the insurer may nonetheless 
maintain effective control of the litigation and settlement process. Although neither a 
New York decision nor one in which selection of counsel was directly at issue, the re­
cent California appellate decision in Western Polymer Technology v. Reliance Ins. Co., 
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Having discussed some of the situations where a conflict was 
found to exist, the next phase of the defense process is the selection 
and retention of competent legal counsel to represent the insured. 
Here, an interesting issue arises as to whether the insurance com­
pany may have any role in the selection of counsel. 
In New York State Urban Development Corp. v. VSL Corp.,2S 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, inter­
preting New York law, held that the insurer was indeed entitled to 
participate in the selection process. The professional liability policy 
at issue in VSL provided that the insurer would pay "all claims ex­
penses" that were incurred in connection with a claim made against 
the insured. Significantly, the policy defined "claims expenses" as 
including fees charged by an attorney designated by the insurer or 
by an attorney chosen by the insured with the written consent of the 
insurer.26 
In VSL, the parties agreed that a conflict did indeed exist. The 
only issue before the court was whether the above provision permit­
ted the insurer to participate in the selection of counsel. The court 
agreed with the insurer, noting that the public policy considerations 
underlying Prashker and Goldfarb did not override the contractual 
provision in the policy. In this regard, the court stated: 
It is not inherently objectionable to permit an insurer to partici­
pate in the selection of independent counsel for the insured as 
long as the insurer discharges its obligation in good faith and the 
attorney chosen is truly independent and otherwise capable of 
defending the insured. 
The participation of the insurer in the selection process does not 
automatically taint the independence of chosen counsel.27 
The court further held that the insurer did not act in bad faith 
by refusing to permit counsel designated by the insured to defend 
the claim. The reason was that counsel had represented the insured 
in the coverage action against the insurer and, accordingly, was hos­
38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78 (Cal. Ct. App.) review denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 2612 (Cal. April 13, 
1995) is instructive. In that case, despite the fact that the insured was being defended 
by a so-called Cumis counsel under section 2860, the insured was not able to preclude 
the insurer from settling a claim in an amount and manner that allegedly injured the 
insured's business reputation and impaired its ability to recover on certain cross-claims 
against other parties. 
25. 738 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984). 
26. [d. 
27. [d. at 65-66. 
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tile towards the interests of the insurer. On this issue, the court 
stated, "it was not unreasonable for [the insurer] to insist on coun­
sel independent to both itself and [the insured]."28 
Additionally, with specific regard to the facts of the VSL case, 
the insurer's willingness to accommodate the insured appeared to 
weigh heavily in the court's reasoning. The insurer had designated 
an unquestionably competent and experienced firm, with whom it 
had no previous dealings, as independent counsel. Alternatively, 
the insurer afforded the insured the opportunity to submit a list of 
proposed counsel to the insurer from which one would be chosen. 
The insurer's manifested desire to "do the right thing" undoubtedly 
cast a favorable light on its position. 
Since VSL was decided, insurance companies have attempted 
to invoke the rule allowing them to have meaningful input in the· 
selection of counsel. To their dismay, however, the VSL holding 
has been limited to its facts in subsequent decisions. For example, 
in Emons Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance CO.,29 the pol­
icy contained a "duty to defend" provision but lacked any require­
ment that the insured obtain the insurer's consent before retaining 
counsel. In the court's view, that fact alone distinguished Emons 
from VSL, and the insurer was not permitted to participate in coun­
sel's designation.30 
III. ILLINOIS 
Illinois law, like that of New York and California, generally 
provides that if a conflict of interest is created by the insurer reserv­
ing its rights, the insured is entitled to assume control of its own 
defense, and the insurer must pay reasonable costs of defense in­
curred by independent counsel retained by the insured.31 
"In determining whether a conflict of interest exists, Illinois 
28. Id. at 66. 
29. 749 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
30. Another distinguishing feature of Emons was that the insurer sought to re­
place counsel who had been defending the underlying action, an exceedingly complex 
matter, for several years. The court found that to allow the insurer to "pull the plug" on 
its insured at that juncture would cause irreparable harm to the insured. Id. at 1295. 
31. See, e.g., Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132,384 N.E.2d 335 (1978); Nandorf, Inc. 
v. CNA Ins. Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 134, 479 N.E.2d 988 (1985); O'Bannon v. Northern 
Petrochemical Co., 113 Ill. App. 3d 734, 447 N.E.2d 985 (1983); Clemmons v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 88 Ill. 2d 469, 430 N.E.2d 1104 (1981);. See also Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976); Illinois Masonic Medical Ctr. v. Thregum 
Ins. Co., 168 III. App. 3d 158, 522 N.E.2d 611 (1988) (specifically referring to "reason­
able " costs) .. 
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courts have considered whether, in comparing the allegations of the 
complaint to the policy terms, the interest of the insurer would be 
furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those all ega­
tions."32 The courts have identified two situations as creating con­
flicts of interest so great as to require independent counsel: claims 
alleging both covered and uncovered loss and claims where there 
are conflicts between multiple parties insured by the same insurer. 
Most frequently, conflicts will exist when allegations of both cov­
ered and uncovered loss are made, creating the situation where 
proof of certain facts would shift liability from the insurer to the 
insured. 
Several cases illustrate the analysis employed by the Illinois 
courts in determining whether an insured is entitled to independent 
counsel. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers ,33 the Supreme Court 
of Illinois found a conflict where the insurer on a homeowner's pol­
icy was required to defend an underlying personal injury action in 
which allegations of negligent conduct (insured) and allegations of 
intentional injury (uninsured) were made. The court reasoned that 
if the insured is held responsible, it would be in his interest to be 
found negligent, which, under the terms of the policy would place 
the financial loss on the insurer. On the other hand, it would be to 
the insurer's interest to have a determination that the insured com­
mitted an intentional act, thus excluding the resulting loss from cov­
erage. In these situations, as appears to be the case in California 
and New York, it is not necessary for the insured and insurer to be 
complete adversaries or for mutually exclusive theories of recovery 
to be advanced.34 For example, in Pepper Construction Co. v. Casu­
alty Insurance Co., the court refused to dissolve a preliminary in­
junction requiring the insurer to relinquish control of the defense 
and reimburse the tnsured for defense costS.35 The underlying dis­
pute in the case involved a contract between plaintiff, Pepper Con­
struction Company, and Marshall Field & Co. to construct a store. 
Plaintiff was the general contractor and had used various subcon­
tractors. After construction was completed, sections of the store 
32. See Pepper Const. Co. v. Casualty Ins. Co., 145 Ill. App. 3d 516, 517, 495 
N .E.2d 1183, 1184 (1986); Nandorf, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 137,479 N .E.2d at 992; County of 
Massac v. United Stated Fidelity & Guar., 113 Ill. App. 3d 35, 43, 446 N.E.2d 584, 590 
(1983). 
33. 64 Ill. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976). 
34. See, e.g., Pepper, 145111. App. 3d at 519, 495 N.E.2d at 1185; Nandorf, 134 Ill. 
App. 3d at 139, 479 N.E.2d at 993. 
35. Pepper, 145 Ill. App: 3d at 520,495 N.E.2d at 1186. 
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roof collapsed under heavy snowfall. At the time of the collapse, 
the plaintiff was insured by defendant Casualty. Marshall Field 
filed suit against the plaintiff and its subcontractors to recover con­
sequential damages and repair costs paid to plaintiff. 
Casualty acknowledged liability coverage for the consequential 
damages but denied coverage for work performed by the plaintiff. 
It argued ·that given its acknowledgment of liability for the conse­
quential damages, a conflict was not created as its interests were not 
clearly opposed to the insured's, and in fact its acknowledged liabil­
ity gave it a greater interest in the insured's defense. The court 
found this argument to be without merit. The insured's interest was 
in a finding that it was vicariously liable for work performed by a 
subcontractor, since in that event, Casualty was required to indem­
nify it under the terms of its policy. In contrast, Casualty's interest 
was in a finding that the insured's liability was based on work Pep­
per performed, as this was not covered. The court found an "obvi­
ous" conflict between the insurer and insured with regard to the 
repair costs, stating: 
The particulars of the conflict of interest do not matter, only the 
fact that there is a conflict at all. The insured has the right to be 
defended by counsel of his own choosing. A ruling that required 
an insured to be defended by what amounted to his enemy in the 
litigation would be foolish.36 
In Perkins Insurance Co. v. Home Insurance Co. ,37 the court 
rejected the insured's argument that a conflict was created by the 
fact that the insurer was interested in keeping litigation costs to a 
minimum, while the insured wished to obtain a full and vigorous 
defense. The court emphasized that Illinois has recognized only 
two situations where the conflict of interest was so great as to re­
quire independent counsel, and these facts did not fit within either 
exception.38 This is completely at odds with the VSL case discussed 
above. 
Likewise, punitive damages do not necessarily constitute a con­
flict entitling the insured to independent counsel. In Nandorf, Inc. 
v. CNA Insurance Co. ,39 the complaint in the underlying action 
sought a large amount of punitive damages ($100,000) and a rela­
36. Id. at 520, 495 N.E.2d at 1185 (quoting Murphy v. Urso, 88 III. 2d 444, 454, 430 
N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (1981». 
37. 134 Ill. App. 3d 31, 479 N.E.2d 1078 (1985). 
38. Id. at 34, 479 N.E.2d at 1081. 
39. 134 Ill. App. 3d 134, 479 N.E.2d 988 (1985). 
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tively small amount of compensatory damages ($5,000). The in­
surer disclaimed liability only for the punitive damages. While the 
insured and insurer shared a common interest in a finding of no 
liability, the court reasoned that their interests diverged if the in­
sured was found liable. Under those circumstances, the insurer's 
interest would have been just as well served by an award of minimal 
compensatory damages and substantial punitive damages. As a re­
sult, the insurer had an interest in providing a less than vigorous 
defense to the allegations supporting an imposition of punitive 
damages. Although the court found a conflict existed based on the 
facts before it, it stated: 
Our finding that a conflict of interest existed in the instant case is 
not meant to imply that an insured is entitled to independent 
counsel whenever punitive damages are sought in the underlying 
action. Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this litiga­
tion, punitive damages formed a substantial portion of the poten­
tial liability .... Notwithstanding the common interest of both 
insurer and insured in finding total non-liability in the third party 
action, the remaining interests of the two conflicted to such an 
extent as to create an actual ethical conflict of interest warranting 
payment of the insured's independent counsel by the insurer.4o 
The court in Illinois Municipal League Risk Management Asso­
ciation v. Seibert, after discussing NandorJ, said "the proportional­
ity between compensatory and punitive damages should not be a 
guiding factor" in determining whether a conflict of interest exists.41 
The underlying litigation in this case involved an action against Sei­
bert, a police officer, for violations of section 1983 of the Civil 
Rights Act which allegedly occurred during an arrest. The plaintiff 
sought $10,000,000 in compensatory and $5,000,000 in punitive 
damages. The Association (a self-insurance program for municipal­
ities) denied liability for punitive damages. The court found a con­
flict existed, as the Association could benefit by a finding that 
Seibert's conduct justified a punitive damage award since the Asso­
ciation could be required to pay only minimal compensatory dam­
ages, while Seibert could be personally liable for a large punitive 
damage award. Further, as Seibert noted, punitive damages can be 
awarded in civil rights litigation without proving actual damages.42 
40. [d. at 140, 479 N.E.2d at 993-94. 
41. 223 Ill. App. 3d 864, 875, 585 N.E.2d 1130, 1137, appeal denied, 596 N.E.2d 1 
(1992). 
42. [d. at 876, 585 N.E.2d at 1138. 
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However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance 
Co. 43 found that although plaintiffs in the underlying case claimed a 
large amount of punitive damages ($25 million in each count) as 
well as treble damages, no conflict was created. The court distin­
guished Nandor! from the case before it, stating: "it is conceivable 
the plaintiffs' request for compensatory damages 'as proven' might 
result in a large award of compensatory damages."44 
Illinois courts have also decided that, contrary to the New York 
court's analysis in Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Guagenti45 an in­
surer's interest in negating policy coverage does not in and of itself 
create a sufficient conflict to give rise to independent counsel.46 
For example, in Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bailey, the court 
found "a conflict of interest cannot be inferred merely because an 
insurance company is asserting noncoverage in a separate suit. The 
test is whether or not there are conflicting interests based upon the 
allegations found in the complaint."47 Here, the defendant in the 
underlying action was found guilty of battery in a criminal proceed­
ing. The victim of the battery filed a civil suit alleging a cause of 
action for negligence. The insurer provided a defense but filed a 
declaratory judgment action asserting that there was no coverage 
under either its automobile or homeowner's policies. 
The insured alleged this situation created a conflict of interest 
which entitled him to independent counsel. The court disagreed, 
finding that there was nothing in the allegations of the complaint 
showing the interests of the insurer would be furthered by provid­
ing a less than vigorous defense. The interests of the parties were 
identical, i.e., to defeat the claim or minimize the damages 
recovered. 
In contrast, the court in Royal Insurance Co. v. Process Design 
Associates, Inc. , looked beyond the allegations in the complaint and 
found that a conflict was created based upon the actions of the in­
surer.48 Royal, the general liability insurer, brought suit against its 
insured and an excess insurer, seeking declaratory judgement that it 
43. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 
1987). 
44. Id. at 1047. 
45. 599 N.Y.S.2d 215 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1993), see supra note 21 and accompanying 
text. 
46. Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 160 Ill. App. 3d 146, 154, 513 N.E.2d 490, 
496 (1987). 
47. Id. 
48. 221 Ill. App. 3d 966, 582 N.E.2d 1234 (1991). 
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was not contractually obligated to a provide defense or indemnity 
coverage to the insured. In the underlying actions, two employees 
filed personal injury suits against the insured, Process Design; both 
alleged violations of the Illinois Structural Work Act and common 
law negligence. 
Royal sent a letter to Process stating it was defending the com­
plaints because of the allegations of negligence and further advised 
that should the complaints be amended to include allegations of 
professional negligence, there might be a question as to whether or 
not Royal would continue to defend the actions, given that the pol­
icy contained a professional liability exclusion. Royal contended 
that no conflict existed because the underlying complaints never 
made allegations of professional negligence. Thus, when comparing 
the allegations in the complaint to the policy provisions, its interests 
could not have been furthered by a less than vigorous defense. 
However, the court found that Royal's actions during the time it 
defended the case belied this argument, stating: 
[D]efendants urge that Process was prejudiced by Royal's as­
sumptions of its defense. Defendants maintain that, not only did 
Royal not advise Process of its intention of reserving the profes­
sional negligence exclusion, but Royal then undertook Process' 
defense for over three years while attempting to find a way in 
which Process might be found professionally negligent, thereby 
relieving Royal of liability. For support, defendants point to the 
several letters and memos written by Royal which indicate that, 
throughout its defense of Process, it was working towards discov­
ering a way to invoke its professional liability exclusion, thus im­
munizing itself from liability to Process.49 
Consequently, the court found that Royal was estopped from 
claiming it was not obligated to indemnify Process because of its 
failure to advise Process of the conflict of interest and its failure to 
properly reserve its rights. As previously mentioned, the second 
situation in which Illinois courts have recognized conflicts of inter­
est is when multiple parties are insured by the same insurer. For 
example, in Murphy v. Urso,50 the Supreme Court of Illinois found 
that a conflict requiring independent counsel arose when an injured 
passenger in a vehicle sued both the owner (a preschool) and oper­
ator of the vehicle (driver for preschool).51 The operator's negli­
49. Id. at 976, 582 N.E.2d at 1241. 
50. 88 II\, 2d 444, 430 N.E.2d 1079 (1981). 
51. Id. 
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gence appeared clear, leaving the owner's primary defense that the 
vehicle was operated without its permission at the time of the 
accident. 
The insurer controlled the defenses of both defendants, and 
their interests were diametrically opposed. The owner's best de­
fense was to show that the operator did not have permission to use 
the bus at the time of the accident, thus, shifting all liability to him, 
while the operator's best defense was to establish permission, thus 
shifting the risk of loss to the owner (and ultimately to the insurer, 
which created an additional conflict). Given this conflict, the oper­
ator was entitled to independent counsel.52 In the employment 
context, multi-party conflicts will most likely be present in sexual 
harassment cases, where both the employer and alleged harasser 
are named as defendants. The employer is likely to argue that the 
alleged harasser acted outside the scope of his or her employment, 
and thus, the employer should not have liability for the illicit 
conduct. 
Finally, Illinois courts have discussed several ways in which a 
conflict can be resolved in lieu of appointing independent counsel. 
The insurer can, of course, waive its coverage defenses and defend 
without asserting a reservation of rights. Alternatively, the insured, 
after full disclosure of the conflicts, can accept the defense of coun­
sel appointed by the insurer. 53 According to the court in Royal, 
"[i]f the insurer has adequately informed the insured of its election 
to proceed under a reservation of rights, and the insured accepts the 
insurer's tender of defense counsel the insurer has not breached its 
duty of loyalty and is not estopped from asserting policy de­
fenses. "54 A declaratory judgment action may also be available to 
the insured in some instances depending on the nature of the con­
52. Note that the driver in the case was not a named insured under the policy. 
The" court noted that, "[i]t makes no difference that here the conflict was with a putative 
insured instead of directly with the named insured." Id. at 444-45, 430 N.E.2d at 1084. 
53. Similarly, in this regard, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(e) (1993) provides: 

The insured may waive its right to select independent counsel by signing the 

, following statement: "1 have been advised and informed of my right to select 

independent counsel to represent me in this lawsuit. 1 have considered this 

matter fully and freely waive my right to select independent counsel at this 

time. I authorize my insurer to select a defense attorney to represent me in 
this lawsuit." 
Id. 
54. Royal Ins. Co. v. Process Design Assocs., Inc., 221 III. App. 3d 966, 973-74, 
582 N.E.2d 1234, 1239 (1991) (citing Cowan v. Ins. Co., 22 III. App. 3d 883, 896, 318 
N.E.2d 315, 326 (1974». 
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flict at issue.55 However, it will not be appropriate in those circum­
stances where the coverage issue is closely or directly connected to 
the issue of the insured's liability in the underlying action.56 
If the insurer assumes the defense under a reservation of rights 
and fails to advise the insured of the conflict created, it is estopped 
from denying coverage according to the Royal courtY Similarly, in 
Peppers, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated, "[i]f, however, by the 
insurer's assumption of the defense the insured has been induced to 
surrender his right to control his own defense, he has suffered a 
prejudice which will support a finding that the insurer is estopped 
to deny policy coverage."58 
While Illinois courts seem uniform in permitting the insured to 
select independent counsel, the Seventh Circuit in Tews Funeral 
Home, found the insurer's providing a short list of reputable and 
qualified counsel from which the insured could select its defense 
counsel to be a reasonable compromise to the disputed issue of 
counsel selection.59 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Turning away from the legal considerations, what practical dy­
namics operate within the EPLI relationship between insurer and 
insured to help assure both parties that their interests will be served 
by selection of a competent, cooperative, and cost-effective defense 
counsel? 
While defense counsel retained by the insurer can never place 
the interests of the insurer above that of the insured when those 
interests conflict, it is generally recognized that such counsel also 
55. But see Village Management, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Accident 
Co., 662 F. Supp. 1366, 1373 (N.D. Ill. 1987), which seems to state that this alternative 
should not be pursued when a conflict of interest prevents an insurer from undertaking 
the insured's defense. 
56. Thornton v. Paul, 74 III. 2d 132, 157, 384 N.E.2d 335, 345-46 (1978). In this 
regard, the Illinois Supreme Court said: 
Requiring the injured party to appear in the declaratory judgment action between the 
insurer and the insured may deprive the injured party of his choice of forum and time 
for bringing suit. Furthermore, he would appear as a defendant rather than as a plain­
tiff, which may alter the burdens of proof and going forward with the evidence. 
Id. (citing, Note, Use of the Declaratory Judgment To Determine a Liability Insurer's 
Duty to Defend-Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87, 101 (1965». 
57. Royal, 221 III. App. 3d at 977-78, 582 N.E.2d at 1242. 
58. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 III. 2d 187, 195, 355 N.E.2d 24, 29 
(1976). 
59. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th 
Cir. 1987). 
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owes certain duties to the insurer. As a practical matter, one can­
not lose sight of the reality that such counsel are retained on a regu­
lar basis by the insurer and their long-term economic interests 
depend upon the relationship with the insurer, and not the insured. 
Even so, it is not panel counsel's role to assist the insurer in 
investigating coverage issues or to become an advocate for the in­
surer's coverage position. In fact, panel counsel must be extremely 
circumspect in how it handles the communication of any informa­
tion to the insurer that may impact adversely on coverage of the 
insured. 
Nonetheless, this does not imply that defense counsel retained 
by the insurer cannot effectively represent the insured's interest 
even where the defense is being provided pursuant to a significant 
reservation of rights.60 Just as both the insurer and the counsel it 
selects to defend the insured owe duties and obligations to the in­
sureds being defended, the insurer is not without certain protec­
tions of its own legitimate interests when the defense counsel is one 
selected by the insured. In this regard, it may be helpful to consider 
liability policies such as those in the directors' and officers' liability 
("D & 0") area and other policies that do not afford the insurer the 
right and duty to defend and to select counsel. Under those poli­
cies, however, the insurer may nonetheless have an obligation to 
payor reimburse the costs of defense. 
To protect the insurer's interests under these policies, the in­
surer will usually employ policy language to the effect that the in­
sured's right to select counsel is subject to the insurer's consent, 
which shall not be unreasonably withheld. In effect, the defense 
counsel under these policies becomes a "Cumis-type" counsel, as 
discussed above. 
With respect to EPLI insurance, in the author's admittedly bi­
ased view, EPLI insurers are for the most part firmly committed to 
providing this insurance to the marketplace on both a widespread 
and long-term basis. As such, their interests and those of their in­
sureds in handling the defense should be very much in sync. 
lt would thus be foolhardy for an EPLI insurer to assign as 
defense counsel firms or lawyers having no meaningful employment 
litigation experience but who otherwise do defense work for an in­
surer at relatively attractive rates. In fact, EPLI insurers have put 
60. Perhaps the best discussion of this issue may be found in Federal Ins. Co. v. 
X-Rite, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Mich. 1990). See supra note 4 and accompanying 
text. 
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together a fairly impressive "panel" of defense counsel qualified in 
the employment area and generally at rates significantly higher 
than those paid for most other insurance defense work. Addition­
ally, there are a number of reasons why an EPLI insurer may be 
willing to entertain the insured's wishes as to choice of counsel. 
Employment-related litigation has unfortunately reached every 
nook and cranny of this vast nation. It is rather impractical for an 
insurer to have well-qualified counsel in place for each and every 
jurisdiction and divisions thereof. Therefore, in certain cases, an 
insurer may be quite willing (and in fact may have no choice but) to 
listen to its insured as to selection of counsel if the insured has a 
local counsel with the appropriate expertise. 
Also, insurers are usually open to suggestions as to how they 
may improve upon their panel of qualified counsel. In particular 
situations, therefore, an insurer may be willing to "try out" a new 
counsel recommended by an insured. 
In summary, the EPLI insurer may well be able to prevail upon 
its contractual language in retaining the right to select defense 
counsel, but the legal, business, and practical considerations dis­
cussed above present some very significant limitations on that right. 
